The ANC and Social Security: The Good, the Bad and the Unacknowledged

In 1994, the African National Congress ran an expensive, slick and effective election campaign.1 Some of you may recall ANC’s slogans at the time. This [powerpoint of JOBS, PEACE FREEDOM ad] was one of a series in which the echoes of the freedom charter are audible. The anchor strapline for the whole campaign was A Better Life For All – and this was what the election manifesto was called.

The 1994 manifesto promised everything one might have anticipated: public works, job creation, workers’ rights, rural development, land reform, better education and health provision. But what about social welfare? A brief paragraph, headed Welfare and Pensions, promised a caring approach; special programmes for homeless children; an end to disability discrimination, and a commitment to old age pensions. The only reference to welfare grants was this sentence: ‘Pensions and grants due to people will be assured and allocated through post offices, banks, building societies or other outlets which are easy for rural people to use.’

The manifesto had a much longer companion piece, the Reconstruction and Development Programme, running to over 150 pages. The RDP was essentially a wish-list presented as policy proposals, a commitment to social transformation in broad, vague terms. On welfare and social security, it offered a little more than the manifesto, but not much more. ‘Social security and social welfare’ featured as the eleventh of eleven Basic Needs.

Social security was defined as having two main components: social insurance schemes for employees and a ‘social safety net’. Support from the safety net could come either in the form of cash or in-kind benefits, and would be focussed on the disadvantaged. However, in a balancing act typical of the RDP, the Basic Needs chapter also carried this warning: ‘Although a much stronger welfare system is needed to support all the vulnerable, the old, the disabled and the sick who currently live in poverty, a system of “handouts” for the unemployed should be avoided.’ (The distinction being made is a very old one: between the ‘deserving poor’ and the ‘undeserving poor’.)

Let me fast-forward to 2014, another election year, and another ANC manifesto: Together we Move South Africa Forward. It is longer and much more detailed than the 1994 version – but equally reticent on the issue of social security: it has been dubbed ‘remarkably coy about welfare reform’.2 Towards its end, there are eight sentences on social welfare. They note that since 1994 ‘The number of people receiving social grants increased from 3 million to 16 million, benefitting the elderly, children and [military] veterans.’ There are three aims for the next five years: to train more social workers; to finalise policy discussions for a comprehensive social protection policy; and to ‘Continue to roll out existing social grants to those who qualify.’

In the 20 years between these two elections there lies a truly remarkable story about social security and the ANC. It is remarkable in scale: today, over 18 million people – one of every three South Africans – receives a grant or pension. The ANC government currently spends 3.5% of GDP on social protection: much more than in comparable middle-income countries.

Secondly, it is remarkable in the way that benefits are delivered, using a high-tech system of biometric identification and smart-card payments. ‘It is a complex interchange between the state and citizen that occurs millions of times each month’3, a digitised social contract.
Thirdly, it is remarkable in its economic, social and political salience. The welfare cash transfers are the most effective mechanism of redistribution used by the ANC. Pensions and grants have stabilised livelihoods, sustained households and reduced destitution. They have translated materially into benefits for poor South Africans, and politically into high levels of voter support for the ANC in the poorest constituencies.

A remarkable story, then: yet one that was entirely unanticipated in 1994 and largely unacknowledged in 2014. I want to explore that story in more detail. First, I will look at the longer history of social welfare policy and practice, going back to the 1920s. I shall argue that this history has shaped post-apartheid practices and policies quite fundamentally. Secondly, I will look more closely on the evolution of social security policies and provision under the ANC, since 1994. Thirdly, I will very briefly visit what James Ferguson calls ‘the new politics of distribution’ and consider the case for a universal income grant.

The evolution of social protection policies from the 1920s to early 1990s:

In 1928, the Pact government – representing white workers and Afrikaner nationalists – passed an Old Age Pensions Act. In a distinctively South African irony, this progressive initiative was racially motivated, an explicit response to fears of swart gevaar and anxieties about white poverty. The Act made pensions available to white and coloured men and women. They were non-contributory, funded entirely by the state: unusual anywhere at the time and exceptional in the global South. Pensions were means-tested, and they were racially skewed. Whites received £30 p.a. and Coloureds £18. Africans and Indians were excluded – the former on the grounds that ‘native custom … makes provision for maintaining dependent persons.’

In the 1930s, other forms of state-funded social protection were added: unemployment benefits, job programmes, pensions for the blind, disability grants, welfare for poor children. These went mainly to white beneficiaries and to a lesser extent to coloureds. In 1937, a separate Department of Social Welfare was created; a year later almost £10 m or 20% of public expenditure was spent on social welfare services. By 1939, writes Jeremy Seekings, South Africa had ‘created the basis of a remarkable welfare state.’

In 1939, South Africa entered the war, Hertzog resigned and Smuts headed a new government. There was a brief reformist urge during the early 1940s: it has been called liberal, social-democratic and even radical. I am persuaded by those who see the reforms as primarily about centralising and modernising the powers of the state. The best known of the reform initiatives was one that did not succeed: the Gluckman Commission of 1942-44, which recommended a single, co-ordinated National Health Service, providing free health care to all South Africans – recommendations, said Smuts, ‘for which the country is not ready.’

Alongside Gluckman, there flowed a separate stream of support for an expanded welfare system. Smuts grumbled to a correspondent ‘I don’t like all this preoccupation with the post-war paradise on earth … people talk Beveridge instead of war and Hitler.’ Welfare reforms were implemented: most notably, the Pensions Act was amended to include Africans and Indians. So were disability and invalid grants, and pensions for the blind. Deborah Posel sums up these reforms: ‘What was imagined was a racialized welfare state’ with racially differentiated benefits. The aims of the welfarist lobby ‘were fully compatible with the maintenance of a system of white supremacy, albeit one with a much more human face.’

This is important in the light of the National Party election victory in 1948, on the new slogan of apartheid. Although the new government was preoccupied with racial separation, and
ruthless when it came to social control, it shared with the welfare reformers an enthusiasm for a centralised and interventionist state. As John Iliffe puts it, ‘Ironically, during the next forty years the National Party was to elaborate the most extensive welfare system in Africa, a system which, like the Apartheid programme, was born of urbanisation, inequality, state power, and rampant technocracy.’

Let us pursue the history of the old age pensions beyond the 1940s. During the heyday of apartheid – the 1950s and 1960s – the racial differentiation of the value of the pension increased. By the mid-1960s, the African OAP had fallen from being worth 25% of that paid to whites to only 13%. But the picture began to change in the 1970s as the regime was buffeted by acute economic strains and challenged by black political resistance. The government simultaneously beefed up its military and policing capacity, but also ditched such key elements of apartheid as the job colour bar and influx control.

And alongside these statutory changes were less visible but equally important retreats from high apartheid. The annual budget began to redistribute resources from whites to blacks. More was spent on African schools, township infrastructure and public sector wages. And from 1970 to 1993, the real value of pensions received by Africans rose by 7% a year while the numbers receiving it swelled from 400,000 to 1.5 million. In 1993, pension payments were deracialised. All elderly South Africans received the same amount. Pension transfers had become the single most important instrument of redistribution, providing a major source of income for the poorest 20% of the population. At some point in the 1990s, pensions overtook migrant remittances as the most important source of income for rural African households.

In other words, using the fiscus as a means of redistribution – using taxes paid by the better-off to reduce the plight of the poor - was a well-established mechanism before 1994. Of total social spending – welfare plus education plus healthcare – whites received 50% in 1975, but only 32% in 1990 and about 16% in 1993. The ANC government elected in 1994 ‘inherited a budget that was already surprisingly redistributive.’

**The evolution of social protection policies since 1994:**

When it came to policy, the ANC in the 1990s began more or less from scratch. The early 1990s were a hothouse of policy development, groups beavering away on draft policies for the economy, education, health, land reform, gender and much else. Francie Lund has left a vivid account of how intensely she and a handful of colleagues worked on social welfare policy, ‘bridging the gap between vision and provision’, trying to win ‘a race against time’. Once the ANC took office, policy formulation stepped up a gear. There were a plethora of commissions, committees and working groups and in 1997 the welfare department published its *White Paper for Social Welfare*. All of these enquiries were strongly influenced by their context. Their authors were aware of the high levels of expectation among black South Africans. They knew that the AIDS epidemic meant that existing social and economic pressures were likely to worsen. And they were acutely aware of the utter disarray of welfare provisions in large parts of the country, most particularly the former Bantustans. There were 14 different welfare departments; several were riddled with corruption, fraud and inefficiency. ‘Fusing this jumble of bureaucracies into a relatively coherent system’, run by a single department, was an important achievement of the ANC’s first term in office.
1. Expansion

The massive growth in the provision of pensions and grants is the most obvious and most striking feature of the ANC government’s policy and practice. But it did not happen at once. Until about 2000, the total number of recipients rose only gradually. From 2000 it speeded up, but it has been since 2003 that the growth curve is steepest, the expansion fastest. As figure 1 shows very clearly, most of the expansion was due to the numbers receiving Child Support Grants and the doubling in the number of those receiving Disability Grants between 2000 and 2004 – an increase largely attributable to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Child Support Grant was the only category of grant added to the provision existing in 1994. It replaced the State Maintenance Grant, a much more generous grant, received by 200,000 women almost entirely from the coloured, white and Indian populations. The CSG was worth only R100 a month when it was first introduced, but its growth was phenomenal, especially as the age of children eligible for the grant was raised. Between 2001 and 2011 the number of CSG grants rose to 10 million, an increase of 1200% in the decade.

South Africa today has one of the world’s largest social assistance programmes. Among major countries in the global south, it is unmatched in terms of expenditure or in terms of coverage. Although there have been constant concerns within the ANC about the cost of such programmes, government has permitted the expansion. This decision was ‘linked to two quite fundamental predicaments’. Firstly, the radical deterioration of agrarian livelihoods in the ex-homelands. Secondly, the failure of the ANC’s economic policies to create jobs. Even between 2000 and 2008, when GDP grew at over 4% a year, this was largely ‘jobless growth’ and unemployment levels hardly budged. The simultaneity of these two crises, says Ferguson, has brought an abrupt end to both of the ‘great fantasies’ about family life for black South Africans: the rural extended family providing for its members; and the urban nuclear family in which a male bread-winner played this role.

2. Technology

Thanks to Keith Breckenridge, we know a good deal about the rise of South Africa’s ‘biometric state’. For well over a century, successive South African governments have used the available technologies of identification to survey, police, record and control their citizens. The apartheid regime, from the early 1950s, implemented a massive project of fingerprinting as the basis of the Population Register. In the 1980s, fingerprinting as the prerequisite for identity documents was extended to whites. Come democracy – and these huge data banks made possible the mushroom growth of the cash transfer system.

The combination of biometric identification and smart-card payment of grants was piloted in the KwaZulu homeland a decade before it was rolled out nationally. In 1986, Buthelezi appointed the First National Bank to undertake the registration and payment of pensions for KwaZulu. FNB formed a new company which used fingerprint ID as the basis for payments. The bank had a vested interest in finding a way of reaching the millions of people currently outside the banking system.

And precisely this technology provided the ANC with a ready-made solution when it surveyed the fragmented and inefficient welfare system. The Chikane Committee seized on biometric ID as essential for creating ‘a uniform system for the country as a whole’. The 1997 White Paper followed this logic, calling for ‘a National Social Grants Register and automated fingerprint technology’. In 2004, a centralised agency responsible for welfare payments was created: SASSA - the South African Social Security Agency. And in March 2012 SASSA commenced the massive task of creating a biometric record – with fingerprint and voice recordings – for 18.9 million recipients of pensions and grants. Biometric identity
as the platform for delivering social protection has been welded into South Africa’s machinery of state. There is, remarks Breckenridge, ‘a sweet and perplexing irony’ in that technology developed as a means of racial coercion under apartheid is today championed as a key weapon in addressing post-apartheid poverty!19

3. Architecture – size and shape of the welfare system

We have noted the massive expansion of welfare provision after 1994, and the technology that enabled it. But the change in its size did not involve any fundamental change in the overall shape of the welfare state. The only new grant was the CSG, which replaced one so generous that its extension to African children would have been unaffordable. Otherwise, the system expanded through changes to the parameters for each grant: age of eligibility, income threshold for means testing, and so on. The ANC inherited from the late-apartheid state a welfare system of quite generous benefits, paid for from direct taxation. Pensions and grants were targeted at the ‘deserving poor’: people unable to work because of age or infirmity, or because they cared for young children. The ANC expanded this legacy but did not re-engineer it. It may be an exaggeration but Seekings and Nattrass make an arresting claim: ‘If it had not inherited relatively generous old-age pensions, disability grants and the State Maintenance Grant … the ANC government would probably not have introduced such programmes, and would probably not have taken up the Lund Committee’s proposals to introduce the Child Support Grant.’20 Changing the size but not the shape of the welfare system also meant that there was less incentive for the ANC to re-conceptualise the system.

4. Impact

The South African system of mass cash transfers has attracted considerable scholarly attention, with international and comparative studies alongside close-grained local enquiries.21 There is a robust consensus that the system of grants work, that they have positive outcomes in the lives of impoverished and vulnerable people. They have ameliorated ultra-poverty or destitution. The proportion of adults falling into the very lowest of 10 categories for living stands fell from 11% in 2001 to 1% in 2011. Since 2000, cash transfers have reduced the poverty headcount and the poverty gap quite substantially. Paid for by taxes, the grants have been significantly redistributive. Without pensions and grants, the income share of the poorest 40% of the population would have been 3.3% in 2006; with pensions and grants, it rose to 7.6%. Their benefits have been concentrated among the poorest 40% of the population. The grants have improved access to other social benefits, such as education and health-care. They have improved the welfare not only of direct recipients but also other members of their broader households. They have been particularly beneficial to women: 99% of Child Support Grants and 70% of old age pensions to go women.

And yet –

5. Shortcomings

South Africa’s social security net has been flung wide; but in Michael Samson’s telling phrase, it has a very loose weave. Very large numbers of people without resources receive no social assistance at all. This is because the South African welfare system, as it developed from the 1930s, and as it was de-racialised in the 1980s and 1990s, was based on the design of social welfare in Britain, New Zealand and Australia. And like those models it rested on certain mid-twentieth century assumptions. These included: that most people of working age would be able to find jobs; that people in work would insure themselves against short-term unemployment through contributions; and that working people would help provide for their
retirement through contributory pension schemes. Obviously, since 1994 none of these conditions has been met.\textsuperscript{22}

The social security net of the classic Anglo-Saxon liberal model is not intended to provide for the long-term unemployed. And in South Africa, for decades the long-term unemployed have received virtually no financial support from the state or from private schemes. In particular, young men are almost entirely excluded from the system of welfare grants.\textsuperscript{23} One in three South Africans of working age is unemployed and they are overwhelmingly African and coloured men in their 20s and 30s, who have never had a full-time job. The other category excluded from assistance is unemployed women of working age who have no children. So for many young men and women it is more feasible to live with parents or grandparents than to seek for non-existent jobs. Perversely, in many households it is the disabled, the sick and the elderly who generate income and not young men and women in the prime of their lives.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps it is not so much a loosely woven net as one with a great, jagged hole at its centre.

6. Ideology

How does the ANC think about social security? How does it understand and explain its policies? How accurately does its ideology describe its practices? I would argue that ever since 1994 the ANC’s thinking on welfare has been deeply ambivalent. As a senior official in the Department of Social Development put it recently, ‘I think what we are creating is a kind of ambivalent and schizophrenic society when it comes to social grants.’\textsuperscript{25} Although the ANC wants to reduce poverty – of course it does – it is unwilling to acknowledge that cash transfers of pensions and grants have been arguably its most effective pro-poor policy. It is unwilling to do so because the dominant ideological position in government is socially conservative, shot through with anxieties about hand-outs and dependency and a ‘culture of entitlement’. It actively repudiates any notion that welfare provision is here to stay, and probably here to grow. Said President Zuma in 2011, ‘We cannot be a welfare state. We cannot sustain a situation where social grants are growing all the time and think it can be a permanent future.’\textsuperscript{26}

But the ANC’s determination not to be a welfare state predates Zuma’s presidency. In his first State of the Nation address, it was Nelson Mandela who spoke about his government’s commitment ‘to confront the scourge of unemployment, not by way of handouts but by the creation of work opportunities’.\textsuperscript{27} The 1997 \textit{White Paper} acknowledged the need for a social safety net, but defined it in terms of the ‘special needs’ of those unable to work. It called for community development programmes which would ‘increase the capacity of individuals and families to meet their own needs.’ The White Paper also introduced what became a central trope in the ANC’s discourse on welfare: that government would bring about ‘developmental social welfare’. As critics have objected, the term appropriated ‘a developmental discourse to serve conservative ends and legitimise the idea that social security depends on community self-help’, shifting responsibilities from the state to poor communities. Certainly, the notion that ‘developmental social welfare’ was a strategy of a ‘developmental state’ was soon brandished in reductionist and rhetorical ways. To take one example from many; resolutions at the Polokwane conference in 2007 insisted that ‘We are building a developmental state and not a welfare state given that in a welfare state dependency is profound’ and ‘Whilst many families have access to social grants … many of these households and communities remain trapped in poverty, are dependent on the state, and thus unable to access the opportunities created by the positive economic climate.’\textsuperscript{28}

I have quoted Presidents Mandela and Zuma: but if one wants to hear the ANC’s welfare ideology at its most paternalist and most censorious, President Thabo Mbeki is its spokesman.
‘Call me a Thatcherite’, Mbeki goaded the Alliance Left at the public announcement of GEAR in 1996; and he certainly recycled the Iron Lady’s moralising hostility to welfare dependency, her disdain for ‘handouts’, and her belief that what the poor really needed was discipline and self-improvement. Government must ‘reduce the dependence of people on grants’, said Mbeki; people must not think ‘it is sufficient merely to hold out their hands and receive a handout’.

It is worth recalling that Zola Skweyiya - Minister of Social Development for two terms from 1999 to 2009 – tried to contest this discourse on welfare in his party as best he could, from within. Upon taking office, Skweyiya’s call for action marked a ‘stark departure’ from previous government utterances: ‘Our social policies assume the ability of families and communities to respond to the crisis. Welfare has proceeded as if these social institutions are fully functional and provide the full range of social support that is required to restore the well being of people. Such a “business as usual” approach cannot continue.’ The Minister then appointed Vivienne Taylor, well aware of her social democratic views, to chair a Committee of Enquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security. A key recommendation was that government implement a basic income grant (BIG) worth R100 a month (to be phased in over a decade).

Skweyiya championed the proposal, announcing in November 2001 that a BIG was an excellent idea that might be introduced in the next budget; six months later, he added optimistically that ‘nobody disputes the call for a BIG.’ He was wrong. Cabinet quickly distanced itself from the Taylor Committee’s proposal. Trevor Manuel and Thabo Mbeki scoffed that it would make little difference - and anyway was too expensive. Skweyiya continued trying to persuade his colleagues to accept a BIG – but as he recalled here in 2011, ‘There were those who remain violently opposed’ to the idea. In 2006, he hinted that government was still investigating a universal transfer and that ‘something like a BIG’ would be debated at the ANC’s policy conference in 2007. Trevor Manuel retorted that this would bankrupt the country. Had Skweyiya not been Minister between 2000 and 2009 I believe that the dominant ideology within the ANC might well have seen a reduction in welfare provision. A recent overview of the politics and policies of welfare concludes that “Zola Skweyiya played a central role in this drama, recruiting paternalistic conservatives in support of a broadly social democratic position.”

The New Politics of Distribution

In my final section, I want to locate the BIG campaign in South Africa – now a rather exhausted campaign lacking traction – within the challenging and important work of James Ferguson. Obviously, I cannot do any justice to Ferguson here, but can only provide the briefest sketch. Across the global south, he points out – in Asia, Latin America and southern Africa – extensive welfare programmes have been created, targeting the poor, using cash transfers. The ‘really big “development” story of the last twenty years’, he says, is ‘the rise and rise of social protection’. And these countries are tackling poverty by ‘the startlingly simple device of handing out small amounts of money to people deemed to need it.’

Paradoxically, then, a distinctive version of the welfare state has emerged within the neoliberal global order: during an age of privatisation, marketization and the retreat of the state. The politics of distribution, says Ferguson, are ‘avowedly (and …on balance, genuinely) pro-poor … “Pro-poor” and neoliberal – it is the strangeness of this conjunction that Ferguson explores. He has assesses the campaigns around the basic income grant in South Africa and in Namibia as a kind of logical extension of the politics of distribution. I am going to suggest that the arguments for a BIG can be made in three ways, which I shall call pragmatic,
humane and radical. Ferguson does not use this simplified taxonomy – he repeatedly demonstrates that the discourse around BIG combines various, complex and contradictory elements – but I have derived it from my reading of his work.

The pragmatic case for the BIG uses the neoliberal language of ‘investment in human capital’ and ‘empowering’ the poor - enabling them to behave as proper neoliberal subjects, rationally pursuing their interests, using the funds as they saw best, taking risks, being entrepreneurial. The universal grant does not require the surveillance and means-testing of conventional social assistance programmes. The neo-liberal state would require ‘no policing of conduct … no social workers coming into homes – and no costly bureaucracy’. A monthly ATM payment, resting on the proof of a fingerprint or iris scan, requires only one question to be answered: have you been paid this month or not? The state is admirably ‘slim’ yet carrying out a substantial and beneficial economic intervention.

The humane (or social democratic) case amplifies the findings of economists: that ‘a BIG represents an effective, economically affordable and economically beneficial policy instrument’ by focusing on the lives of those who would receive the grant, especially those currently not catered for by the social security net. This case has been made by many, but nowhere more lucidly than by Jonny Steinberg, scholar and author. His account is based on what he observed in Pondoland, when grants and pensions expanded in the early 2000s:

Welfare brings life, not idleness to the worlds of the South African poor… People have money they didn’t before and they want to spend it where they live. And so the enterprising begin selling everything, from building materials to airtime... Welfare also gives young people the means to work ... With money in their pockets, people have the means to out into the world and search. You can see on pension payout day that welfare brings people closer to the mainstream, closer to life. These are not days of shame or resignation. They are festive and generous days, days of laughter and good spirits. With money to spend, people are feeling at their most human.

The radical case for a universal income grant builds on the humane case by seeing the direct distribution of grants ‘not as charity but as liberation’, validating and including those in society who have long been excluded or marginalised. It rests entitlement not upon need but upon citizenship. Citizens are entitled to the monthly grant ‘precisely because they, as the nation’s citizens, are the real owners of the country and its mineral wealth’. A BIG would be ‘what is sometimes termed “a citizen’s income”, a rightful share of a common stock of wealth.’ For a universal grant to have a radical, emancipating potential, it must be uncoupled from the labour market; must abandon the fiction that grants should go only to those unable to work; and instead see their receipt as the ‘emblem of full citizenship’. Poor people, whose labour is no longer required, have acquired other kinds of power, says Ferguson: they have rights within a democratic regime whose mass political base is precisely the historically excluded poor.

I have tried to describe what has been good about the ANC’s social welfare policies since 1994 – especially the beneficial impact of a massively expanded provision. The bad aspect of its record is the failure to cater for the long-term unemployed, in an era when long-term unemployment shows no signs of diminishing. I have also argued that the ANC has been reluctant to acknowledge what it has achieved, and even more unwilling to acknowledge what remains to be done. It remains in denial about its own achievements, insisting that it does not favour a welfare state even while in the process of constructing one. The ANC’s prevailing stance since 1994 – despite the efforts of Zola Skweyiya- ‘was one that chided the
poor for remaining poor, rejected BIG but was unable to resist pressure for major cash transfers to the poor. The government would have to acknowledge this critique if it were ever to take the politics of distribution to another level.

2 Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass, Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming), p. 160. I am extremely grateful to the authors for access to a proof copy of this important work.
3 Kevin Donovan, “The Biometric Imaginary: Standardization & Objectivity in Post-apartheid welfare” (Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town), Working Paper no 335; p. 23.
9 Posel, “The case for a welfare state”, p. 66.
11 This and preceding paragraph based on Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa (Yale, 2005), pp. 147-54, 356, 360; Hein Marais, South Africa pushed to the limit (Zed, 2011), p. 239.
12 For a vivid sense of this process, see the proceedings of the symposium on “The role of research in Transforming South Africa” in Transformation, special issue 18/19 (1992).
14 Marais, South Africa pushed to the limits, p. 241.
18 This and preceding paragraph based on Breckenridge, Biometric State, pp. 137, 181-87.
19 Donovan, “Biometric Imaginary”, pp. 5-6, 7, 1; Breckenridge, Biometric State p. 214.
20 Paragraph based on Seekings & Nattrass, Policy, Politics and Poverty, pp. 136-7, 139-40, 159.
21 Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish, pp. 7-8, 14-19, 102-117, 136-40; Seekings & Nattrass, Policy, Politics & Poverty, pp. 136-41, 147-50; David Neves et al, “The Use and Effectiveness of Social Grants in South Africa”, (Finmark Trust, 2009).
22 Seekings & Nattrass, Policy, Politics and Poverty, pp. 140-41.
23 Jonny Steinberg, “idea of jobs for all blinds us to need for welfare”, Business Day, 26 July 2013.
33 Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish, p. 2.
35 Paragraph draws on Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish, pp. 29-30, 79-84.
38 Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish, pp. 56-7.
39 Marais, South Africa pushed to the limits, p. 250.
40 Everatt, “The Undeserving Poor”, p. 301.